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The National Solidarity Programme: Assessing
the Effects of Community-Driven Development
in Afghanistan
ANDREW BEATH, FOTINI CHRISTIA and
RUBEN ENIKOLOPOV
Over the past two decades, community-based approaches to project delivery have become
a popular means for governments and development agencies to improve the alignment of
projects with the needs of rural communities and to increase the participation of villagers in
project design and implementation. This article briefly summarizes the results of an impact
evaluation of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a community-driven development
programme in Afghanistan that created democratically-elected community development
councils and funded small-scale development projects. Using a randomized controlled
trial across 500 villages, the evaluation finds that NSP had a positive effect on access to
drinking water and electricity, acceptance of democratic processes, perceptions of econ-
omic well-being and attitudes towards women. Effects on perceptions of local and national
government performance andmaterial economic outcomes were, however, more limited or
short-lived.
Introduction
Since the mid-1980s, community-based approaches to project delivery have
become increasingly popular with governments and development agencies.1
Such approaches – termed Community-Driven Development (CDD) – grew out
of the perceived lack of responsiveness of ‘top–down’ programmatic modalities
to local needs.2 Spurred by academic studies that affirmed the ability of commu-
nities to solve collective action problems,3 CDD programmes sought to emphasize
participatory planning modalities by which community members identify projects
that address their specific priorities.4 Such processes, it is often hypothesized, may
not just provide for better-targeted and more efficient projects, but also can
increase participation in local institutions and, with it, build social capital.5
Of the myriad CDD initiatives throughout the developing world, few have
garnered as much attention as the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Afgha-
nistan’s largest development programme. Conceived soon after the fall of the
Taliban regime, NSP was designed to extend the administrative reach of the
state, build representative institutions for local governance and deliver critical
services to the rural population. In villages covered by the programme, NSP
has created gender-balanced Community Development Councils (CDC)
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through a secret-ballot, universal suffrage elections. Once constituted, CDCs
have drafted community-development plans and developed proposals for
village-level development projects that, subject to basic criteria being met, have
been funded by NSP through the disbursement of block grants.
Following the implementation of the first phase of NSP from 2003 to 2007,
international donors and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
requested that the impacts of the programme be rigorously evaluated by indepen-
dent researchers, resulting in the NSP Impact Evaluation (NSP-IE). In the initial
stages of the design of the NSP-IE, a financial constraint arose that limited the
number of villages in each district that could be covered by the programme
between 2007 and 2011. This financial constraint, in conjunction with
demands from stakeholders for a rigorous impact evaluation, informed a joint
decision by NSP, stakeholders and the NSP-IE research team to randomize the
roll-out of NSP across 500 villages in 10 districts spanning northern, eastern,
central and western Afghanistan, with 250 ‘treatment’ villages receiving NSP in
2007 and 250 ‘control’ villages not receiving NSP until 2012. NSP-IE midline esti-
mates were provided by a comparison of economic, political and social indicators
in treatment and control villages in 2009, with endline estimates provided by a
comparison of the same indicators in 2011.
The collective NSP-IE findings provide some instructive lessons for develop-
ment interventions in fragile contexts. That NSP provides a fleeting impetus to
perceptions of central and sub-national government indicates that government
legitimacy is contingent on the continued delivery of services rather than
improved development outcomes per se. The durable positive effects of NSP on
acceptance of democratic norms and female participation further suggest that
the mandating of such practices by development programmes can spur social
change. However, the relative ineffectiveness of CDCs in changing de facto
village leadership structures and the negative impact on perceived local govern-
ance quality indicates that the creation of new institutions in parallel to custom-
ary structures may not have the desired effect, particularly in cases in which the
roles of new institutions are not well defined.
The NSP-IE falls within a class of four rigorous evaluations of CDD pro-
grammes conducted across fragile contexts in the late 2000s.6 King and Samii
synthesize the findings of these studies, concluding that attempts by CDD pro-
grammes to build local institutions in conflict-affected areas have generally
been unsuccessful in generating durable and transferable increases in collective
action.7 They note that the low intensity of these interventions, coupled with mis-
matches between evaluation and programmatic time-frames, may explain part of
the underperformance. On the basis of a similar review, Bennett and D’Onofrio,
attribute the mixed evidence of CDD programmes in conflict-affected contexts to
the lack of a coherent and explicit theory of change.8 It should be noted that NSP
has expressed the view that some of the findings, interpretations, and conclusions
expressed in this summary – and particularly those pertaining to the impacts of
the programme on the quality of local governance and of the impacts of infra-
structure projects – do not reflect its observations and are accordingly disputed.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows: section two describes the
history and characteristics of NSP; section three examines the development
context in Afghanistan; section four reviews the NSP-IE methodology and data
sources; section five summarizes the effects of NSP on economic, institutional
and social outcomes; section six discusses the implications of the findings for
development projects in Afghanistan and other fragile environments; and
section seven concludes.
Programmatic Context
NSP is executed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development,
funded by the World Bank and a consortium of bilateral donors, and facilitated
by 8 national and 21 international NGOs. Programme implementation is struc-
tured around two major interventions at the village level:9
. The election of a gender-balanced CDC through a secret-ballot, universal suf-
frage election centred on democratic processes and women’s participation.10
. The provision of ‘block grants’ – valued at US$200 per household, up to a
village maximum of US$60,000 and averaging US$33,000 – to fund village-
level projects designed and selected by CDCs in consultation with villagers.11
FIGURE 1
PROJECTS FINANCED BY NSP, BY AGGREGATE FUNDING ALLOCATED
Note: Data obtained from NSP sub-project monitoring database and covers 64,188 phase I, II and III projects
initiated in 29,705 communities between 12 July 2003 and 9 January 2013. ‘Other’ transport projects include
pathways (US$10m, 643 projects); bridges (US$7m, 297); and secondary roads (US$6m, 303). ‘Other’ water and
sanitation projects include latrines (US$5m, 566); public baths (US$5m, 306); and hand pumps (US$4m, 328).
‘Other’ irrigation projects include water divider construction (US$5m, 421); pipe schemes (US$3m, 205); and
aqueducts (US$3m, 265). ‘Other’ other projects include livelihoods projects (US$9m, 2,549) and health facilities
(US$2m, 122).
Source: A. Beath, F. Christia and R. Enikolopov, 2013. Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s National
Solidarity Programme-Final Report. World Bank Report No. 81107,Washington, DC:World Bank, 2013 (at: http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18273450/randomized-impact-evaluation-afghanistans-national-
solidarity-programme).
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Projects financed by NSP generally fall into one of six categories: transport;
water and sanitation; irrigation; power; literacy and vocational training; and
other (Figure 1). Between mid-2003 and early 2013, over 64,000 projects were
funded by NSP, at a combined cost of US$1.01 billion.12
In each village, NSP implementation takes approximately three years. The
process of facilitating CDC elections usually takes about 6 months, after which
an average of 12 months elapse before project implementation starts. During
this period, CDCs design projects in conjunction with villagers, submit proposals,
receive funds and, if necessary, procure contractors. Project construction lasts an
average of nine months.
Once implementation of NSP in a village concludes, villages have no assurance
of when – or if – they will receive further NSP activities, either in the form of
facilitated CDC elections or block grants. However, in the current third phase
of the programme, NSP is extending repeater block grants to around 12,000
villages mobilized in the programme’s first phase between 2003 and 2007.13
Country Context
Afghanistan’s population is overwhelmingly rural, with 80 per cent of the popu-
lation living outside the country’s regional and provincial centres.14 Generally,
those living in rural areas suffer from tenuous agriculture-based livelihoods and
limited access to basic amenities, such as clean drinking water, reliable irrigation
and electricity. During the past ten years, various donor-funded interventions
have attempted to enhance food security, improve economic opportunities and
provide access to basic infrastructure. However, the incidence of poverty in
rural areas remains very high, with Afghanistan ranking among the bottom 15
countries in UNDP’s Human Development Index.
Due to conflict and a lack of state consolidation, Afghanistan’s central govern-
ment has historically been weak, with limited capacity for service provision. In
response, rural communities throughout the country have developed informal
yet sophisticated customary local governance structures. The foundation of
these structures is the local jirga or shura, a participatory council that has tra-
ditionally managed local public goods and adjudicated disputes.15 Members of
such councils are generally the elder males of families in the village.16 Villages
also ordinarily have a headman (termed a malik, arbab or qariyadar) – usually
a large landowner – who liaises with district, provincial and central authorities.17
The local religious authority, the mullah, is responsible for conducting rites and
services and mediating disputes involving family or moral issues.18
In rural Afghanistan, women are generally barred from activities outside the
household. Such norms render local governance a male-dominated activity.19
Female mobility is also constrained by customs that require a woman travelling
outside her village to have a male relative as an escort. As a result of these
norms, girls are usually prevented from attending school beyond fourth grade
and, without education or mobility, are constrained in their ability to generate
income.
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Methodology and Data Sources
The NSP-IE represents a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of the second phase
of NSP. In mid-2007, 500 villages eligible for the programme were selected jointly
by the NSP-IE research team, NSP and facilitating partners. The 500 villages are
equally spread across 10 districts in Balkh, Baghlan, Daykundi, Ghor, Herat and
Nangarhar provinces.20 The ten districts depict Afghanistan’s ethno-linguistic
diversity, with five predominantly Tajik districts, four predominantly Pashtun
districts and one predominantly Hazara district. However, due to ongoing
violent conflict, villages from the southern provinces, such as Kandahar and
Helmand, were not able to be included in the sample.
Using a matched-pair cluster randomization procedure, 250 of the 500 villages
were randomly selected to receive NSP in 2007 and comprise the treatment group
for the study, with the remaining villages assigned to the control group.21 The
matched-pair cluster randomization facilitates a transparent and unbiased esti-
mation of programme impacts by ensuring that the background characteristics of
the treatment group are, on average, identical to the control group.22 Accordingly,
any differences that arise between the two groups of villages are attributable to NSP.
Baseline, midline and endline surveys were administered to a random sample
of village households, as well as tomale and female focus groups of village leaders,
between August 2007 and October 2011.23 Collectively, the surveys comprised
over 25,000 household interviews with male and female villagers, as well as
more than 2,600 focus groups with male village leaders and women. The
midline survey is used to estimate impacts of NSP two years after the start of
NSP implementation and after all treatment villages had elected CDCs and
selected projects, but prior to the completion of 82 per cent of NSP-funded pro-
jects.24 The endline survey is used to estimate impacts four years after implemen-
tation and after 99 per cent of NSP-funded projects had been completed, but prior
to the implementation of NSP in control villages.
The hypotheses to be tested by the NSP-IE, constituent indicators and the survey
questions and specifications used to form indicators were formalized in a pre-analysis
plan. The pre-analysis plan was completed prior to the receipt of endline survey data
and registered with the Experiments in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network.25
The pre-analysis plan groups hypotheses and indicators into five broad categories of
outcomes of interest: (1) access to services, infrastructure and utilities; (2) economic
welfare; (3) local governance; (4) political attitudes and state-building; and (5) social
norms.26 The hypotheses were not formulated to judge the effectiveness of NSP in
meeting pre-identified program objectives, but rather to more broadly explore the
reaches of program impact. As such, the hypotheses include both formal ‘project
development objectives’ for which the project should be held accountable as well
outcomes of general interest identified by the research team.27
Results28
This section presents estimates of the midline and endline impacts across the five
categories listed above.
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Access to Utilities, Services and Infrastructure
NSP improves the access of villagers to basic utilities. NSP-funded drinking water
projects increase access to clean drinking water, with the programme increasing
usage of protected sources by 15 per cent at endline. NSP also reduces the time
that households spend collecting water by 5 per cent, although the programme
has no lasting impact on perceived water quality or on the incidence of water
shortages. NSP substantially boosts electricity usage, which rises by 26 per
cent. The size of these effects is substantially higher when the impacts of
NSP-funded water and electricity projects are examined specifically, rather than
the impact of NSP generally.
NSP also increases access to services, including education, health care and
counselling services for women. As NSP does not usually fund such services,
these impacts appear to arise indirectly from other changes induced by NSP.
While there is no impact on boys’ school attendance, NSP increases girls’
school attendance and their quality of learning. NSP further increases child
doctor and prenatal visits and the probability that a woman’s illness or injury
is attended to by a medical professional, although it does not affect other
health outcomes. Finally, NSP more than doubles the proportion of women
who have a group or person with whom they can discuss their problems.
NSP-funded infrastructure projects in irrigation and transportation, however,
appear to be less successful. Specifically, irrigation projects have no impact on the
ability of land-holding villagers to access sufficient irrigation. Although there is
weak evidence that transportation projects increase village accessibility at
midline, the impact does not persist and there is no evidence of impacts on the
costs and times of traveling from the village to the district center or on the mobi-
lity of male villagers.
There is weak evidence to indicate that, once complete, NSP-funded projects
fulfil the development needs of male villagers, as measured by relative changes in
the types of projects that are identified as being most needed by the village. NSP
appears to specifically fulfil demands for drinking water projects, which were
identified as necessary by a higher proportion of male villagers than any other pro-
jects at baseline. The impacts of NSP on aggregate categories of indicators on
access to utilities, services and infrastructure are presented in Table 1.
Economic Welfare
NSP impacts the economic perceptions and optimism of villagers, particularly
women. Female villagers exhibit improved perceptions of the current economic
situation and are more optimistic about future changes in the local economy,
both at midline and endline. The economic perceptions and optimism of male vil-
lagers improve at midline, but there is only weak evidence of an impact at endline
on optimism and no evidence of a longer-term impact on perceptions.
Despite the changes in economic perceptions, there are few impacts of NSP on
objective economic outcomes. At midline, there is weak evidence that NSP
induces small increases in the diversity of household income sources and in
caloric intake, although both impacts do not persist after project completion.
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At endline, there is weak evidence of impact on the amount borrowed by house-
holds. NSP appears to have no robust impacts at midline or endline on income
levels, income regularity, consumption levels, consumption allocations, assets
or food insecurity.
There is also no evidence that NSP impacts general production and marketing
outcomes. NSP has no discernible impacts on agricultural yields, productivity or
the proportion of harvests sold, although the programme induces a fleeting
increase at midline in agricultural sales revenue. NSP also does not affect
whether households sell animals or animal products or the revenue derived
from such activities. While NSP increases handicraft sales and sales revenue at
midline, these impacts disappear following project completion.
At endline andmidline, there is evidence that NSP reduces the net migration of
households from villages, although both results lose statistical significance if
migration patterns at baseline are controlled for. In addition, there is no evidence
at endline that NSP induces any changes in net within-household migration.
The limited impact of NSP on economic welfare is potentially explained by the
apparent ineffectiveness of infrastructure projects in inducing changes in agricul-
tural productivity and access to markets and by the fact that more successful types
of projects (such as water and electricity) are not designed to induce changes in
local economic activity in the near-term. However, the sustained positive
impact on female economic perceptions demonstrates the broader improvements
brought to women’s lives by female participation in CDC activities and by NSP-
funded drinking water projects.
The impacts of NSP on aggregate economic welfare indicators are presented in
Table 2.
TABLE 1
AGGREGATE IMPACT OF NSP ON ACCESS TO UTILITIES, SERVICES AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
Midline Endline
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Access to utilities 0.058 0.018 0.071 0.006
Access to clean drinking water 0.060 0.023 0.064 0.028
Access to electricity 0.051 0.300 0.108 0.045
Access to services 0.022 0.065 0.055 0.000
Access to female counselling 0.219 0.000 0.192 0.001
Access to education – – 0.058 0.035
Health outcomes/access to health services 0.040 0.597 0.009 0.013
Access to infrastructure 0.023 0.209 0.005 0.872
Access to irrigation – – 0.015 0.696
Village accessibility and villager mobility 0.202 0.174 0.026 0.669
Note: Coefficients and p-values for the mean average treatment effect for all indicators grouped in the
hypothesis or in hypotheses that pertain to the particular group or family.
Source:A. Beath, F. Christia and R. Enikolopov, 2013.Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s
National Solidarity Programme-Final Report. World Bank Report No. 81107,Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2013 (at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18273450/randomized-impact-
evaluation-afghanistans-national-solidarity-pro gramme).
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Local Governance
The creation of CDCs by NSP more than doubles the proportion of local assem-
blies that contain at least one female member. CDC creation also causes custom-
ary leaders to affiliate with representative assemblies during project
implementation, although this effect is not sustained beyond project completion.
There is no evidence that NSP changes the composition of local leadership or
introduces new leaders into the core group of village decision-makers.
At midline, the creation of CDCs by NSP increases the provision of local gov-
ernance services, the activity level of customary authorities and the role of repre-
sentative assemblies in providing local governance services. These impacts
generally do not persist following the completion of NSP activities in treatment
villages, although NSP does result in a durable increase in the number of meetings
held annually by representative assemblies. There is also strong evidence that NSP
induces a durable increase in the provision of local governance services specific to
women.
NSP increases villager participation in local governance at midline, as
measured by meeting attendance and a desire to change leader decisions, and
increases the proportion of villagers that prefer representative assemblies to
be involved in local governance. However, while the desire to change leader
decisions persists beyond project completion, NSP has neither a durable
impact on the probability of villagers attending assembly meetings nor on
the extent to which they believe assemblies should be involved in local
governance.
TABLE 2
AGGREGATE IMPACT OF NSP ON ECONOMIC WELFARE
Midline Endline
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Perceptions 0.118 0.000 0.080 0.001
Stocks and flows 0.021 0.048 0.016 0.204
Security of household income 0.049 0.059 0.023 0.355
Household consumption expenditure 0.007 0.796 –0.008 0.781
Household assets 0.013 0.553 0.020 0.428
Borrowing for food and medical needs 0.009 0.721 0.056 0.168
Food security 0.016 0.282 –0.004 0.831
Production and marketing 0.026 0.669 0.202 0.174
Agricultural productivity 0.034 0.773 0.411 0.163
Non-agricultural productivity 0.018 0.358 –0.007 0.843
Migration 0.090 0.009 0.061 0.116
Net migration of households 0.187 0.026 0.164 0.080
Net migration of household members – – –0.036 0.161
Note: Coefficients and p-values for the mean average treatment effect for all indicators grouped in the
hypothesis or in hypotheses that pertain to the particular group or family.
Source:A. Beath, F. Christia and R. Enikolopov, 2013.Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s
National Solidarity Programme-Final Report. World Bank Report No. 81107, Washington, DC:World
Bank, 2013 (at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18273450/randomized-impact-
evaluation-afghanistans-national-solidarity-pro gramme).
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At endline, NSP has a negative impact on local governance quality as per-
ceived by male villagers, reducing satisfaction with the work of local leaders by
8 per cent and almost doubling dissatisfaction with the recent decisions or
actions of village leaders. While NSP induces an increase at midline in the
extent to which village leaders are perceived as being responsive to the needs of
women, this effect does not persist.
The impacts of NSP on aggregate local governance indicators are presented in
Table 3.
Political Attitudes and State-Building
The evidence of NSP’s impact on democratic values is mixed. There is strong evi-
dence that NSP increased voting in the 2010 parliamentary elections, with the
proportion of male and female villagers who claimed to have cast a ballot
being 4 and 10 per cent higher, respectively, in treatment villages. NSP also
appears to raise appreciation of democratic elections, at least as manifested by
a 24 per cent increase in the proportion of male villagers who prefer that the
village headman is subject to a secret-ballot election. However, NSP has no
effect on female views of democratic elections, on participatory decision-
making procedures or on the already-high proportion of male villagers who
believe the President or provincial governor should be elected. NSP also has no
impact on the proportion of villagers who believe it appropriate to discuss gov-
ernance issues publicly or who support the participatory resolution of major
village issues.
TABLE 3
AGGREGATE IMPACT OF NSP ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Midline Endline
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Structure 0.226 0.000 0.135 0.000
Composition of village leadership 0.001 0.977 0.009 0.769
Affiliation of leadership with representative assemblies 0.172 0.000 0.043 0.193
Female representation in local governance 1.261 0.000 0.894 0.000
Function 0.074 0.000 0.038 0.014
Provision of local governance services 0.030 0.054 0.009 0.636
Activity of village leadership & institutions 0.112 0.000 0.067 0.013
Role of representative assemblies 0.061 0.002 0.022 0.376
Quality and participation 0.033 0.004 –0.016 0.245
Participation in local governance 0.096 0.000 0.082 0.001
Perceptions of quality of local governance 0.012 0.430 –0.073 0.002
Informal taxation by village leaders – – –0.037 0.426
Preferences for representative assemblies 0.045 0.029 0.031 0.149
Note: Coefficients and p-values for the mean average treatment effect for all indicators grouped in the
hypothesis or in hypotheses that pertain to the particular group or family.
Source:A. Beath, F. Christia and R. Enikolopov, 2013.Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s
National Solidarity Programme-Final Report. World Bank Report No. 81107, Washington, DC:World
Bank, 2013 (at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18273450/randomized-impact-
evaluation-afghanistans-national-solidarity-pro gramme).
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There is only weak evidence that NSP increases the legitimacy of the central
government. In particular, NSP has no impact on whether villagers believe that
the government should exercise jurisdiction over local crimes, set the school cur-
riculum, issue ID cards or collect income tax. Furthermore, NSP has no impact on
whether villagers prefer a centralized state (as opposed to a weak federation) or
who identify primarily as Afghan (as opposed to a member of a specific ethnic
group). At midline, NSP increases linkages of villages with government officials
and representatives of the Afghan National Security Forces, although these
effects do not last beyond the period of project implementation.
There is strong evidence that NSP improves perceptions of government enti-
ties at midline, but only weak evidence of such impacts at endline. During
project implementation, NSP induces a highly significant increase in the reported
benevolence of a wide range of government entities, but this impact mostly fades
following project completion, with weak positive impacts observed only for the
President and central government officials. This pattern is also true of perceptions
of NGO officials, although NSP has a durable positive impact on perceptions of
International Security Assistance Force soldiers. While the impacts of NSP on per-
ceptions of government at midline indicate that the programme is generally per-
ceived as government-owned, the reversion of villagers to original attitudes vis-a`-
vis the government once project funds are expended seems to imply that govern-
ment legitimacy is tied more to the regularized provision of public goods than to
development outcomes per se.
NSP does not appear to impact the likelihood of villages suffering violent
attacks (at least as reported by villagers) at midline or endline. There is also no
evidence that NSP affects the ability of insurgent groups to expropriate harvests.
However, NSP improves perceptions of the local security situation among both
male and female villagers at midline, although only the impacts observed for
male villagers persist beyond project completion.
The impacts of NSP on aggregate categories of indicators measuring political
attitudes and state-building are presented in Table 4.
Social Norms
In accordance with observations that public resource decisions can sometimes
aggravate intra-communal divisions, we find weak evidence that, during project
implementation, NSP increases the incidence of disputes and feuds, while redu-
cing the rate at which such disputes are resolved. Once projects are complete,
this general effect disappears, however, and there is weak evidence that NSP
slightly reduces intra-village disputes at endline. There is also some evidence at
endline that NSP increases interpersonal trust among male villagers, although
no evidence of a midline impact for male villagers or an impact at midline or
endline for female villagers. Given the small magnitude of the observed
changes, there is no evidence of a discernible impact of NSP on aggregate
measures of social cohesion.
During project implementation, NSP improves the basic literacy and compu-
tation skills of male and female villagers, although these impacts do not last.
There is also some evidence that NSP makes villagers happier. Specifically,
THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME 311
there is weak evidence of a reduction in the proportion of female villagers who
report that they are unhappy, a result that could be caused by the increased avail-
ability of counselling services for women, increased female participation in local
governance and/or increased access to basic utilities and services.
NSP increases men’s acceptance of female participation in political activity
and local governance. Specifically, the programme increases male acceptance of
female electoral participation, national candidacy by women and women
holding civil service or NGO positions by 3, 4 and 6 per cent respectively. NSP
also causes a 22 per cent increase in acceptance of female membership of
village councils and a 15 per cent increase in acceptance of female participation
in the selection of the village headman. The impact of NSP on women’s views
on female participation in political activity and local governance is more mar-
ginal. NSP also appears to have limited impacts on reducing cultural constraints
limiting female educational opportunities.
Beyond attitudes, NSP has positive impacts on gender outcomes. NSP has
durable positive impacts on the participation of women in local governance.
Specifically, a 21 per cent increase is observed in the participation of women in
dispute mediation and a 14 per cent increase is observed in the involvement of
women in aid allocation. Although NSP does not appear to impact intra-village
mobility of women, female socialization or female participation in economic
activity or household decision making, it does produce a durable increase in
the ability of women to travel beyond their village. Specifically, women in NSP
TABLE 4
AGGREGATE IMPACT OF NSP ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND STATE-
BUILDING
Midline Endline
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Democratic values 0.023 0.004 0.033 0.004
Acceptance of democratic norms 0.033 0.001 0.022 0.076
Electoral participation/political knowledge 0.004 0.801 0.054 0.014
State legitimacy 0.066 0.000 0.041 0.050
Acceptance of central government authority 0.009 0.454 0.028 0.093
Linkages between villages and government 0.201 0.000 0.071 0.245
Perceptions of government 0.063 0.000 0.038 0.051
Perceptions of central government 0.051 0.000 0.036 0.080
Perceptions of sub-national government 0.120 0.000 0.050 0.147
Perceptions of government-allied actors 0.058 0.005 0.034 0.102
Security 0.041 0.091 0.042 0.126
Violent incidents 0.023 0.665 0.042 0.495
Informal taxation by insurgent groups – – –0.042 0.266
Perceptions of local security 0.061 0.030 0.045 0.168
Note: Coefficients and p-values for the mean average treatment effect for all indicators grouped in the
hypothesis or in hypotheses that pertain to the particular group or family.
Source:A. Beath, F. Christia and R. Enikolopov, 2013.Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s
National Solidarity Programme-Final Report. World Bank Report No. 81107, Washington, DC:World
Bank, 2013 (at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18273450/randomized-impact-
evaluation-afghanistans-national-solidarity-pro gramme).
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villages are 13 per cent more likely to have visited the nearest village in the past
year and 11 per cent more likely to have visited the district centre in the past
month.
The size of the impact of these results in the aggregate categories of indicators
is presented in Table 5.
Discussion
The study’s results provide a rigorous assessment of the absolute impact of NSP
on a broad set of outcomes. Comprehensive though they may be, the results have
important limitations. In the absence of other comparable evaluations on other
development programmes in Afghanistan, the findings of the NSP-IE do not
allow comparisons to be made between the effectiveness of NSP and other pro-
grammes. For the same reason, it is very difficult to make qualitative judgements
concerning the relative size of the observed impacts or whether they collectively
might be used to designate NSP as a ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ project.
The results nonetheless point to several areas of achievement and other areas
of concern. The participatory approach adopted by NSP has borne fruit in devel-
oping a role for women in local public decision making and, in so doing,
TABLE 5
AGGREGATE IMPACT OF NSP ON SOCIAL NORMS
Midline Endline
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Social cohesion –0.005 0.778 0.007 0.695
Disputes & resolution rates –0.060 0.096 –0.009 0.800
Interpersonal trust 0.032 0.044 0.018 0.363
Literacy and computational ability 0.057 0.003 –0.001 0.966
Happiness 0.022 0.284 0.035 0.113
Gender attitudes 0.016 0.010 0.037 0.000
Acceptance of female political participation 0.006 0.535 0.046 0.005
Acceptance of female economic and social
participation
0.019 0.183 0.031 0.075
Cultural constraints to education of girls 0.007 0.273 0.017 0.220
Acceptance of female participation in local
governance
0.029 0.026 0.059 0.001
Gender outcomes 0.046 0.000 0.034 0.012
Women’s involvement in local governance 0.041 0.000 0.079 0.000
Social activity among women 0.006 0.417 –0.017 0.303
Women’s mobility 0.120 0.000 0.039 0.185
Participation in economic activity & household
decision making
0.001 0.967 0.003 0.905
Note: Coefficients and p-values for the mean average treatment effect for all indicators grouped in the
hypothesis or in hypotheses that pertain to the particular group or family.
Source:A. Beath, F. Christia and R. Enikolopov, 2013.Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s
National Solidarity Programme-Final Report. World Bank Report No. 81107, Washington, DC:World
Bank, 2013 (at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/07/18273450/randomized-impact-
evaluation-afghanistans-national-solidarity-pro gramme).
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countering the traditional dominance of male elites over local governance. NSP
bridges the considerable gap between villages and the central government,
while drinking water and electricity projects funded by the programme address
critical needs of villagers and improve their lives. On the other hand, the relative
ineffectiveness of NSP-funded infrastructure projects calls for further investi-
gation. Likewise, some of the results suggest that it may be necessary to assess
whether the presence of CDCs inadvertently diffuses institutional accountability
in Afghan villages.
The following sections discuss implications of the results for other develop-
ment projects in post-conflict settings, with a focus on how projects can best
enhance government legitimacy, strengthen local accountability and participation
and facilitate the acceptance of the participation of marginalized groups in local
public affairs.
Effects on Government Legitimacy
NSP is funded by theWorld Bank and bilateral aid agencies, managed by theMin-
istry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and facilitated by 29 NGOs. This
arrangement has allowed NSP to benefit from the substantial local knowledge
and expertise built up by the NGO sector in Afghanistan during the two
decades of conflict the country suffered prior to 2001, while also clearly linking
the programme with the Government of Afghanistan.
The NSP-IE results suggest that, while NSP increases the favourability of indi-
viduals’ views towards the government, this effect fades after the completion of
NSP-funded projects. This, in turn, indicates that villagers perceive NSP as a gov-
ernment-sponsored intervention and that government support is contingent upon
the continual provision of public goods and services, such as development pro-
jects. Thus, even though NSP-funded projects deliver a development impact in
improving access to utilities, this is not sufficient to improve perceptions of gov-
ernment unless there is an expectation of future service provision.29 Accordingly,
the effects of development interventions on government legitimacy in post-con-
flict settings may be maximized by instituting a regularized and frequent
pattern of project activity.
Accountability of Local Governance Structures
Local ownership is a core principle of NSP, with the mandated election of CDCs
and the participatory selection of public goods projects financed by NSP block
grants. The process of establishing CDCs and involving villagers in project selec-
tion has produced a number of positive effects, such as increasing the number of
meetings held by village assemblies, increasing participation in and preferences
for democratic elections, increasing female participation in local governance
and liberalizing men’s attitudes to female participation in local governance.
Despite these positive effects, however, the study finds that, once NSP-funded
projects are complete, the overall effect of NSP on male perceptions of the quality
of local governance deteriorates. In addition, the institutional relevance of the
CDC – relatively strong at midline – fades substantially following project com-
pletion. These results suggest that the diffusion of institutional authority created
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by the co-existence of CDCs with local customary institutions and the ambiguous
mandates of CDCs following project completion may produce perverse effects on
local governance. The results underscore the need to provide new local insti-
tutions with a clear mandate distinct from those of existing local institutions.
Participation of Women
The most positively surprising set of results in the study are those pertaining to the
durable impacts wrought by NSP on perceptions of gender roles and on women’s
lives generally. Of particular note is that while other impacts – such as those on
perceptions of government – are not sustained beyond project completion, the
effects on gender norms and gender outcomes do not fade. These results
provide a strong vindication of NSP’s policy of mandating female participation
in CDC elections, CDC composition, and the selection and management of sub-
projects, which have produced changes in women’s lives that extend far beyond
both the scope of programme activities and the lifecycle of programme implemen-
tation. Accordingly, similar approaches might be adopted in development projects
in other post-conflict environments to facilitate acceptance of democratic norms
and participation in public affairs of women and other marginalized groups.
Conclusion
By embracing bottom–up approaches to development, CDD empowers local
communities to select and manage projects which best address local priorities.
NSP, the largest development programme in Afghanistan, has brought CDD to
all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and in so doing has overcome vast challenges
posed by insecurity, prevailing gender norms and suspicion of the central govern-
ment. The NSP-IE provides a rigorous, large-scale quantitative evaluation of the
impacts of NSP across a wide range of economic, institutional and social out-
comes and can potentially serve as an important tool for policy making for
CDD and other programmes in Afghanistan and other post-conflict settings.
The findings of the NSP-IE identified some aspects in which NSP is succeeding
and other areas where performance has been more limited. Specifically, the results
show that NSP positively affects the access of villagers to drinking water and elec-
tricity, increases acceptance of democratic processes, improves perceptions of
economic well-being and lessens constraints to the participation of women in
public affairs. However, positive effects on attitudes towards central and sub-
national government fade quickly following the completion of NSP-funded pro-
jects. Moreover, NSP negatively affected perceptions of local governance quality
among male respondents, while the composition and behaviour of the customary
village leadership appears to be unaffected by the intervention.
The results provide important lessons for development interventions in post-
conflict contexts. First, the positive and durable impacts observed on female par-
ticipation and acceptance of democratic processes are a vindication of NSP’s
policy of mandating female participation and democratic CDC elections in a
context in which such practices contrast with local customs. Second, the positive
but temporary impact of NSP on perceptions of central government indicates that
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development projects can assist in building government legitimacy in fragile
states, but that such improvements in legitimacy are reliant upon a predictable
and continuous stream of public goods and services provided by the central gov-
ernment. Finally, the finding that local governance as perceived by male respon-
dents did not improve suggests caution is called for when establishing new local
institutions in parallel with customary structures. Particular care must be paid to
ensure that the new local bodies are provided with specific mandates distinct from
those of existing institutions.
The process of conducting the NSP-IE has also generated lessons that may be
useful to the design and implementation of similar development interventions.
First, it is important that studies present a precise account of the specifics of the
intervention and the context in which it is implemented. As demonstrated by the
results of the variations tested by the NSP-IE and reported elsewhere,30 relatively
minor variations in programmatic components can result in pronounced differ-
ences in impacts. Accordingly, only when provided with a precise description
of the components of the programme can policy-makers make informed
decisions.
Second, further efforts must be made to ensure research designs are geared
towards understanding the long-term impact of programmes on outcomes of
interest to policy-makers. While academics are rewarded for original experimen-
tal interventions with relatively short gestation periods, practitioners and policy-
makers are often interested in understanding impacts on outcomes that may take
many years to evolve and in establishing whether similar programmes have
common impacts across different contexts.
Third, the ability to isolate rigorously the impact of CDD programmes – and
to help them improve – is greatly enhanced where logical frameworks enumerate
distinct and quantifiable outcome indicators that the programme aspires to
impact. When outcome indicators are not well defined ex-ante by the programme,
disagreements may arise ex-post between researchers and practitioners about
whether a given outcome was measured correctly. Failures to adequately
specify assumptions underlying a logical framework may meanwhile inhibit
researchers from being able to isolate why a particular intervention failed to
have the desired effect and provide recommendations to improve programmatic
effectiveness.
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